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Abstract
Despite the great achievements of the modern deep neural
networks (DNNs), the vulnerability/robustness of state-of-
the-art DNNs raises security concerns in many application
domains requiring high reliability. Various adversarial attacks
are proposed to sabotage the learning performance of DNN
models. Among those, the black-box adversarial attack meth-
ods have received special attentions owing to their practicality
and simplicity. Black-box attacks usually prefer less queries
in order to maintain stealthy and low costs. However, most
of the current black-box attack methods adopt the first-order
gradient descent method, which may come with certain defi-
ciencies such as relatively slow convergence and high sensi-
tivity to hyper-parameter settings. In this paper, we propose
a zeroth-order natural gradient descent (ZO-NGD) method to
design the adversarial attacks, which incorporates the zeroth-
order gradient estimation technique catering to the black-box
attack scenario and the second-order natural gradient descent
to achieve higher query efficiency. The empirical evaluations
on image classification datasets demonstrate that ZO-NGD
can obtain significantly lower model query complexities com-
pared with state-of-the-art attack methods.
Introduction
Modern technologies based on machine learning (ML) and
specifically deep learning (DL), have achieved significant
breakthroughs (LeCun, Bengio, and Hinton 2015) in vari-
ous applications. Deep neural network (DNN) serves as a
fundamental component in artificial intelligence. However,
despite the outstanding performance, many recent studies
demonstrate that state-of-the-art DNNs in computer vision
(Xie, Wang, and et. al. 2018; Zhao et al. 2017), speech
recognition (Alzantot, Balaji, and Srivastava 2018; Li et al.
2019) and deep reinforcement learning (Lin, Hong, and et.
al. 2017) are vulnerable to adversarial examples (Goodfel-
low, Shlens, and Szegedy 2015), which add carefully de-
signed imperceptible distortions to legitimate inputs aiming
to mislead the DNNs at test time. This raises concerns of the
DNN robustness in many applications with high reliability
and dependability requirements.
With the recent exploration of adversarial attacks in im-
age classification and objection detection, the vulnerabil-
ity/robustness of DNNs has attracted ever-increasing atten-
tions and efforts in the research field known as adversarial
machine learning. A large amount of efforts have been de-
voted to: 1) designing adversarial perturbations in various
ML applications (Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy 2015;
Carlini and Wagner 2017; Chen et al. 2017a; Zhao et al.
2019c; Xu et al. 2018); 2) security evaluation methodolo-
gies to systematically estimate the DNN robustness (Biggio,
Fumera, and Roli 2014; Zhang, Weng, and et. al. 2018); and
3) defense mechanisms against adversarial attacks (Bulo`,
Biggio, and et. al. 2017; Demontis, Melis, and et. al. 2018;
Madry et al. 2017; Wang et al. 2019; Wang et al. 2018b;
Xu et al. 2019; Wang et al. 2018a). This work mainly in-
vestigates the first category to build the groundwork towards
developing potential defensive measures in reliable ML.
However, most of preliminary studies on this topic fo-
cus on the white-box setting where the target DNN model
is completely available to the attacker (Goodfellow, Shlens,
and Szegedy 2015; Carlini and Wagner 2017; Zhao et al.
2018). More specifically, the adversary can compute the gra-
dients of the output with respect to the input to identify
the effect of perturbing certain input pixels, with complete
knowledge about the DNN model’s internal structure, pa-
rameters and configurations. Despite the theoretical interest,
it is unrealistic to adopt the white-box adversarial methods to
attack practical black-box threat models (Zhao et al. 2019b),
where the internal model states/configurations are not re-
vealed to the attacker (e.g., Google Cloud Vision API). In-
stead, the adversary can only query the model by submitting
inputs and obtain the corresponding model outputs of pre-
diction probabilities when generating adversarial examples.
In the black-box adversarial setting, it is often the case
that the less queries, the more efficient an attack becomes.
Large amount of queries may be at the risk of exposing the
adversary or high financial cost in the case where the query
is charged per query. Notably, to date most of the white-
box (Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy 2015; Carlini and
Wagner 2017) and black-box attacks (Chen et al. 2017b;
Ilyas et al. 2018; Zhao et al. 2019a) are based on first-order
gradient descent methods. Different from the widely utilized
first-order optimization, the application of second-order op-
timization (Martens 2016) is less explored due to the large
computation overhead, although it may achieve faster con-
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vergence rate. The work (Osawa et al. 2018) adopts natural
gradient descent (NGD) to train ResNet-50 on ImageNet in
35 epochs, demonstrating its great potentiality.
In this work, inspired by the superb convergence per-
formance of NGD, we propose zeroth-order natural gradi-
ent descent (ZO-NGD), which incorporates the zeroth-order
(ZO) method and the second-order NGD, to generate black-
box adversarial examples in a query-efficient manner. The
contributions of this work are summarized as follows:
+ Design of adversary attacks with NGD: To the best of
our knowledge, we are the first to derive the Fisher informa-
tion matrix (FIM) and adopt the second-order NGD method
for adversarial attacks, which is different from other first-
order-based white-box and black-box attack methods.
+ Co-optimization of zeroth-order and second-order
methods: In the black-box setting, we incorporate the
zeroth-order random gradient estimation to estimate the
gradients which is not directly available, and leverage the
second-order NGD to achieve high query-efficiency.
+ No additional queries to obtain the FIM: During the
queries to estimate the gradients of the loss, with our design
the Fisher information is a byproduct that are extracted and
evaluated without requiring additional query complexity.
+ Scalability to high dimensional datasets: In NGD, it is
computationally infeasible to compute and invert the FIM
with billions of elements on large scale datasets like Im-
ageNet. To address this problem, we propose a method to
avoid the computation and inverse of the FIM and thus the
computation complexity is at most the same as the input im-
ages, rather than its square (the dimension of the FIM).
Related Work
In adversarial ML, the black-box setting is more practical
where the attacker can only query the target model by pro-
viding input images and receive the probability density out-
put for the input.
Black-box Attack
Attack with gradient estimation In the black-box set-
ting, as the gradients are not directly available, gradient es-
timation methods via zeroth-order optimization (Wang et al.
2018c; Tu et al. 2018; Duchi et al. 2015) are proposed to es-
timate the gradients. The ZOO method (Chen et al. 2017b)
performs pixel-level gradient estimation first and then per-
form white-box C&W attack (Carlini and Wagner 2017)
with the estimated gradients. Despite its high success rate,
it suffers from intensive computation and huge queries due
to element-wise gradient estimation.
The more practical threat models are investigated in (Ilyas
et al. 2018). New attack methods based on Natural Evolu-
tionary Strategies (NES) and Monte Carlo approximation to
estimate the gradients are developed to mislead ImageNet
classifiers under more restrictive threat models. The work
(Ilyas, Engstrom, and Madry 2018) further proposes to use
the prior information including the time-dependent priors
and data-dependent priors to enhance the query efficiency.
Different from the previous first-order-based methods, the
work (Ye et al. 2018) exploits the second-order optimization
to improve query efficiency. In general, they explore Hessian
information in the parameter space while our work explores
the Hessian information in the distribution space (aka infor-
mation matrix). Particularly, our method obtains the Fisher
information during the first-order information (gradients) es-
timation for free while the mentioned paper needs additional
queries for Hessian-based second-order optimization.
Heuristic black-box attacks In the transfer attack (Pa-
pernot, McDaniel, and Goodfellow 2016), the attacker first
trains a surrogate model with data labeled by the target
model. White-box attacks are applied to attack the surrogate
model and the generated examples are transferred to attack
the target model. However, it may suffer from low attack
success rate due to the low similarity between the surrogate
model and the target model.
The boundary method (Brendel, Rauber, and Bethge
2017) utilizes a conceptually simple idea to decrease the
distortion through random walks and find successful adver-
sarial perturbations while staying on the misclassification
boundary. However, it suffers from high computational com-
plexity and lacks algorithmic convergence guarantees.
Second-order optimization
First-order gradient descent methods have been extensively
used in various ML tasks. They are easy to implement and
suitable for large-scale DL. But these methods come with
well known deficiencies such as relatively-slow convergence
and sensitivity to hyper-parameter settings. On the other
hand, second-order optimization methods provide a elegant
solution by selectively re-scaling the gradient with the cur-
vature information (Martens 2016). As a kind of second-
order method, NGD proves to be Fisher efficient by us-
ing the FIM instead of the Hessian matrix (Amari 1998;
Martens 2014). But the large overhead to compute, store
and invert the FIM may limit its application. To address
this, Kronecker Factored Approximate Curvature (K-FAC)
is proposed to train DNNs (Grosse and Martens 2016).
Problem Formulation
Threat Model: In this paper, we mainly investigate black-
box adversarial attacks for image classification with DNNs.
Different from the white-box setting which has fully access
to the DNN model and its internal structures/parameters,
the black-box setting constrains the information available
to the adversary. The attacker can only query the model
by providing an input image and obtain the DNN output
score/probability of the input. The black-box setting is more
consistent with the scenario of “machine-learning-deployed-
as-a-service” like Google Cloud Vision API.
In the following, we first provide a general problem for-
mulation for adversarial attack which can be adopted to ei-
ther white-box or black-box settings. Then, an efficient solu-
tion is proposed for the black-box setting. We highlight that
this method can be easily adopted to the white-box setting by
using the exact gradients to achieve higher query efficiency.
Attack Model: Given a legitimate image x ∈ Rd with its
correct class label t, the objective is to design an optimal ad-
versarial perturbation δ ∈ Rd so that the perturbed example
(x + δ) can lead to a misclassification by the DNN model
trained on legitimate images. The DNN model would mis-
classify the adversarial example to another class t′ 6= t. δ
can be obtained by solving the following problem,
minimize
δ∈S
f(x+ δ, t), (1)
where S = {δ|(x+δ) ∈ [0, 1]d, ‖δ‖∞ ≤ } and f(x+δ, t)
denotes an attack loss incurred by misclassifying (x+ δ) to
another class t′. ‖ · ‖∞ denotes the `∞ norm. In problem
(1), the constraints on S ensure that the perturbed noise δ
at each pixel (normalized to [0, 1]) is imperceptible up to a
predefined -tolerant threshold.
Motivated by (Carlini and Wagner 2017), the loss function
f(x, t) is expressed as
f(x+ δ, t) = max{ log p(t|x+ δ)
−max
i6=t
{log p(i|x+ δ)},−κ}, (2)
where p(i|x) denotes the model’s prediction score or prob-
ability of the i-th class for the input x, and κ is a confi-
dence parameter usually set to zero. Basically, f(x + δ, t)
achieves its minimum value 0 if p(t|x + δ) is smaller
than maxi 6=t log p(i|x + δ), indicating there is a label with
higher probability than the correct label t and thus a mis-
classification is achieved by adding the perturbation δ to
x. In this paper, we mainly investigate the untargeted at-
tack which does not specify the target misclassified la-
bel. The targeted attack can be easily implemented follow-
ing nearly the same problem formulation and loss func-
tion with slight modifications (Carlini and Wagner 2017;
Ilyas, Engstrom, and Madry 2018). We focus on the general
formulation here and omit the targeted attack formulation.
Note that in Eq. (2), we use the log probability log p(i|x)
instead of p(i|x) because the output probability distribution
tends to have one dominating class. The log operator is used
to reduce the effect of the dominating class while it still pre-
serves the probability order of all classes.
As most of the white-box attack methods rely on gradient
descent methods, the unavailability of the gradients in black-
box settings will limit their application. Gradient estimation
methods (known as zeroth-order optimization) are applied
to perform the normal projected first-order gradient descent
process (Ilyas et al. 2018; Liu et al. 2019) as follows,
δk+1 =
∏
S
(
δk − λ∇ˆf(δk)
)
, (3)
where λ is the learning rate and the
∏
S(·) performs the pro-
jection onto the feasible set S.
In the black-box setting, it is often the case that the query
number is limited or high query efficiency is required by the
adversary. The zeroth-order method tries to extract gradi-
ent information of the objective function and the first-order
method is applied to minimize the loss due to its wide ap-
plication in ML. However, the second-order information of
the queries is not fully exploited. In this paper, we aim to
take advantages of the model’s second-order information
and propose a novel method named ZO-NGD optimization.
Zeroth-order Nature Gradient Descent
The proposed method is based on NGD (Martens 2014) and
ZO optimization (Duchi et al. 2015). In the applications of
Algorithm 1 Framework of ZO-NGD.
Require:
The legitimate image x; the correct label t; the model to
be queried; the learning rate λ; the sampling step size µ;
Ensure:
Adversarial perturbation δ;
1: initialize δ0 with all zeros;
2: for k = 0, ...,K do
3: Query the model with δk and obtain the probability
p(t|x, δk) := p(t|x+ δk);
4: for j = 1, ..., R do
5: Generate a random direction vector uj drawn from
a uniform distribution over the surface of a unit
sphere;
6: Query the model with x + δk + µuj and obtain
p(t|x, δk + µuj);
7: end for
8: Estimate the gradients of the loss function ∇ˆf(δk)
according to Eq. (16);
9: Estimate the gradients of the log-likelihood function
∇ˆ log p(t |x, δk ) according to Eq. (17);
10: Compute the FIM F according to Eq. (18) and per-
form the nature gradient update as shown in Eq. (19).
11: end for
optimizing probabilistic models, NGD uses the natural gra-
dient by multiplying the gradient with the FIM to update
the parameters. NGD seems to be a potentially attractive
alternative method as it requires fewer total iterations than
gradient descent (Ollivier 2015; Martens and Grosse 2015;
Grosse and Salakhudinov 2015).
Motivated from the perspective of information geometry,
NGD defines the steepest descent/direction in the realizable
distribution space instead of the parameter space. The dis-
tance in the distribution space is measured with a special
“Riemannian metric” (Amari and Nagaoka 2007), which is
different from the standard Euclidean distance metric in the
parameter space. This Riemannian metric does not rely on
the parameters like the Euclidean metric, but depends on the
distributions themselves. Thus it is invariant to any smooth
or invertible reparameterization of the model. More details
are discussed in the Geometric Interpretation Section.
Next we will introduce the FIM and the implementa-
tion details to perform NGD. Basically, the proposed frame-
work first queries the model to estimate the gradients and
Fisher information. Then after the damping and inverting
processes, natural gradient is obtained to update the pertur-
bation. Algorithm 1 shows the pseudo code of the ZO-NGD.
Fisher Information Matrix and Natural Gradient
We introduce and derive the FIM in this section. In general,
finding an adversarial example can be formulated as a train-
ing problem. In the idealized setting, input vectors x are
drawn independently from a distribution Qx with density
function q(x), and the corresponding output t is drawn from
a conditional target distribution Qt|x with density function
q(t |x ). The target joint distribution is Qt,x with the density
of q(t,x) = q(t|x)q(x). By finding an adversarial pertur-
bation δ, we obtain the learned distribution Pt,x(δ), whose
density is p(t,x|δ) = p(t|x+ δ)q(x) := p(t|x, δ)q(x).
In statistics, the score function (Cox and Hinkley 1979)
indicates how sensitive a likelihood function p(t,x|δ) is to
its parameters δ. Explicitly, the score function for δ is the
gradient of the log-likelihood with respect to δ asbelow,
s(δ) = ∇ log p(t,x|δ). (4)
Lemma 1 The expected value of the score function with re-
spect to δ is zero.
The proof is shown in the appendix. We can define an uncer-
tainty measure around the expected value (i.e., the covari-
ance of the score function) as follows,
E
[
(s(δ)− E[s(δ)]) (s(δ)− E[s(δ)])T
]
. (5)
The covariance of the score function above is the definition
of the Fisher information. It is in the form of a matrix and
the FIM can be written as
F = Ex∈Qx
[
Et˜∼p(·|x,δ )
[
∇ log p (t˜,x |δ )∇ log p (t˜,x |δ )T ]] .
(6)
Note that this expression involves the losses on all possible
values of the classes t˜, not only the actual label for each
data sample. As δ only corresponds to a single input x, the
training set only contains one data sample. Besides, since
p(t˜,x|δ) = p(t˜|x+ δ)q(x) = p(t˜|x, δ)q(x) and q(x) does
not depend on δ, we have
∇ log p(t˜,x|δ) = ∇ log p(t˜|x, δ) +∇ log q(x)
= ∇ log p(t˜|x, δ). (7)
Then the FIM can be transformed to
F = Et˜∼p(·|x,δ )
[
∇ log p(t˜|x, δ)∇ log p(t˜|x, δ)T
]
. (8)
The exact expectation with T categories is expressed as,
F =
T∑
t˜=1
p
(
t˜ |x, δ )∇ log p (t˜ |x, δ )∇ log p (t˜ |x, δ )T (9)
The usual definition of the natural gradient is
∇˜f(δ) = F−1∇f(δ), (10)
and the NGD minimizes the loss function through
δk+1 = δk − λ∇˜f(δk). (11)
Outer Product and Monte Carlo Approximation
The FIM involves an expectation over all possible classes
t˜ ∼ p (· |x, δ ) drawn from the probability distribution out-
put. In the case with large number of classes, it is impractical
to compute the exact FIM due to the intensive computation.
To address the high computation overhead, in general there
are two methods to approximate the FIM, the outer product
approximation and the Monte Carlo approximation.
Outer Product Approximation The outer product ap-
proximation of the FIM (Pascanu and Bengio 2013a; Ol-
livier 2015) only uses the actual label t to avoid the expecta-
tion over all possible labels t˜ ∼ p (· |x, δ ), as below,
FOP = ∇ log p (t |x, δ )∇ log p (t |x, δ )T . (12)
Thus a rank-one matrix can be obtained directly.
Monte Carlo Approximation Monte Carlo (MC) approx-
imation (Ollivier 2015) replaces the expectation over t˜ with
nMC samples,
FMC =
1
nMC
nMC∑
i=1
∇ log p (t˜i |x, δ )∇ log p (t˜i |x, δ )T . (13)
where each t˜i is drawn from the distribution p (· |x, δ ). The
MC natural gradient works well in practice with nMC = 1.
For higher query efficiency, we adopt the outer product
approximation as it does not require additional queries .
Gaussian Smoothing and Gradient Estimation
To compute the FIM and perform NGD, we need to obtain
the gradients of the loss function∇f(δ) and the gradients of
the log-likelihood ∇p(t|x, δ), which are not directly avail-
able in the black-box setting.
To address this difficulty, we first introduce the Gaussian
approximation of f(x) (Nesterov and Spokoiny 2017),
fµ (x) =
1
(2pi)d/2
∫
Rd
f (x+ µu) exp
(
−1
2
‖u‖2
)
du, (14)
where ‖·‖ is the Frobenius norm, µ > 0 is a smoothing pa-
rameter and u is a random vector distributed uniformly over
the surface of a unit sphere, i.e., u ∼ N (0,Id). Its gradient
can be written as
∇fµ (x) = 1
M
∫
Rd
f (x+ µu)− f (x)
µ
u exp
(
−1
2
‖u‖2
)
du
= Eu
(
f (x+ µu)− f (x)
µ
u
)
, (15)
where Eu is the Gaussian smoothing function. Thus, based
on Eq. (15), we apply the zeroth-order random gradient es-
timation to estimate the gradients by
∇ˆf(δ) = 1
R
R∑
j=1
f(δ + µuj , t)− f(δ, t)
µ
uj , (16)
and
∇ˆ log p(t |x, δ ) = 1
Rµ
R∑
j=1
[log p(t |x, δ + µuj)
− log p(t |x, δ )]uj , (17)
whereR is the number of random direction vectors and {uj}
denote independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) ran-
dom direction vectors following Gaussian distribution.
We note that in each gradient estimation step, by query-
ing the model R + 1 times, we can simultaneously ob-
tain both the ∇ˆf(δ) and ∇ˆ log p(t |x, δ ) as demonstrated
in Algorithm 1. Different from the zeroth-order gradient de-
scent which only estimates the gradients of the loss function
∇ˆf(δ) (such as Chen et al. and Ilyas et al.), ZO-NGD ob-
tains ∇ˆ log p(t |x, δ ) and computes the FIM from the same
query outputs without incurring additional query complex-
ity. This is one major difference between ZO-NGD and other
zeroth-order methods. Thus, higher query-efficiency can be
achieved by leveraging the FIM and second-order optimiza-
tion.
Damping for Fisher Information Matrix
The inverse of the FIM is required for natural gradient. How-
ever, the eigenvalue distribution of the FIM is known to have
an extremely long tail (Karakida, Akaho, and Amari 2018),
where most of the eigenvalues are close to zero. This in turn
causes the eigenvalues of the inverse FIM to be extremely
large, leading to the unstable training. To mitigate this prob-
lem, damping technique is used to add a positive value to the
diagonal of the FIM to stabilize the training as shown below,
Fˆ = ∇ˆ log p (t |x, δ ) ∇ˆ log p (t |x, δ )T + γI, (18)
where γ is a constant. As the damping limits the maximum
eigenvalue of the inverse FIM, we can restrict the norm of
the gradients. This prevents ZO-NGD from moving too far
in flat directions.
With the obtained FIM, the perturbation update is
δk+1 =
∏
S
(
δk − λFˆ−1∇ˆf(δk)
)
. (19)
ZO-NGD tries to extract the Fisher information to perform
second-order optimization for faster convergence rate and
better query efficiency.
Scalability to High Dimensional Datasets
Note that the FIM has a dimension of d2 where d is
the dimension of the input image. On ImageNet dataset
which typically contains images with about 270, 000 pix-
els (x ∈ R299×299×3), the FIM would have billions of
elements and thus it is quite difficult to compute or store
the FIM, not to mention its inverse. In the application of
training DNN models, the Kronecker Factored Approxi-
mate Curvature (K-FAC) method (Martens and Grosse 2015;
Osawa et al. 2018) is adopted to deal with the difficulty of
high dimensions of the DNN model. However, K-FAC meth-
ods may not be suitable in the application of finding adver-
sarial examples as the assumption of uncorrelated channels
is not valid and thus we can not apply the block diagonal-
ization method for the FIM. Instead, we propose another
method to compute Fˆ−1 of high dimensions as follows. First
we have
∇ˆ log p (t |x, δ ) = c ∇ˆ log p (t |x, δ )‖∇ˆ log p (t |x, δ )‖ = c
sˆ(δ)
‖sˆ(δ)‖ , (20)
where c = ‖sˆ(δ)‖. The inverse matrix Fˆ−1 can be repre-
sented as,
Fˆ−1 =
((
c2 + γ
)−1 − γ−1)
c2
sˆ (δ) sˆ (δ)T + γ−1I. (21)
This can be verified simply by checking their multiplication
and we omit the proof here. Then the gradient update ∆δ =
λFˆ−1∇f(δ) in Eq. (19) is
∆δ = λ

((
c2 + γ
)−1 − γ−1)
c2
sˆ (δ) sˆ (δ)T + γ−1I
 ∇ˆf (δ)
= λ
((
c2 + γ
)−1 − γ−1)
c2
sˆ (δ)
[
sˆ (δ)T ∇ˆf (δ)
]
+ λγ−1∇ˆf (δ) .
(22)
During the computation of∆δ = λFˆ−1∇f(δ), we compute
sˆ (δ)
T ∇ˆf (δ) first in Eq. (22) and obtain a scalar, then ∆δ
is simply the sum of two vectors. Although Fˆ and its inverse
might have billions of elements, we avoid directly comput-
ing them and the dimension of the internal computation is
at most the same level as the dimension d of the images,
rather than its square d2. Thus, the ZO-NGD method can be
applied on datasets with high dimensional images.
Geometric Interpretation
We provide a geometric interpretation for the natural gradi-
ent here. The negative gradient −∇f(δ) can be interpreted
as the steepest descent direction in the sense that it yields
the most reduction in f per unit of change of δ, where the
change is measured by the standard Euclidean norm ‖·‖
(Martens 2014), as shown below,
−∇f(δ)
‖∇f(δ)‖ = lim→0
1

arg min
‖α‖≤
f(δ +α). (23)
By following the −∇f(δ) direction, we can obtain the
change of δ within a certain -neighbourhood to minimize
the loss function.
Lemma 2 The negative natural gradient is the steepest de-
scent direction in the distribution space.
We provide the proof of Lemma 2 in the appendix1. In
the parameter space, the negative gradient is the steepest de-
scent direction to minimize the loss function. By contrast,
in the distribution space where the distance is measured by
KL divergence, the steepest descent direction is the negative
natural gradient. Thus, the direction in distribution space de-
fined by the natural gradient will be invariant to the choice
of parameterization (Pascanu and Bengio 2013b), i.e., it will
not be affected by how the model is parametrized, but only
depends on the distribution induced by the parameters.
Experimental Results
In this section, we present the experimental results of the
ZO-NGD method. We compare ZO-NGD with various at-
tack methods on three image classification datasets, MNIST
(Lecun et al. 1998), CIFAR-10 (Krizhevsky and Hinton
2009) and ImageNet (Deng et al. 2009).
We train two networks for MNIST and CIFAR-10
datasets, respectively. The model for MNIST achieves
99.6% accuracy with four convolutional layers, two max
pooling layers, two fully connected layers and a softmax
layer. For CIFAR-10, we adopt the same model architecture
as MNIST, achieving 80% accuracy. For ImageNet, a pre-
trained Inception v3 network (Szegedy et al. 2016) is uti-
lized instead of training our own model, attaining 96% top-5
accuracy. All experiments are performed on machines with
NVIDIA GTX 1080 TI GPUs.
Evaluation of White-box Attack
We first check the white-box setting, where we compare the
proposed NGD with PGD from adversarial training. PGD is
a typical first-order method while NGD utilizes the second-
order FIM. The query here is defined as one forward pass
and one subsequent backpropagation as we need to obtain
Table 1: Performance evaluation of black-box adversarial at-
tacks on MNIST and CIFAR-10.
dataset Attack method successrate
average
queries
reduction
rate
MNIST
Transfer attack 82% - -
ZOO attack 100% 8,300 0%
NES-PGD 98.2% 1,243 85%
ZO-NGD 98.7% 523 93.7%
CIFAR
Transfer attack 85% - -
ZOO attack 99.8 % 6,500 0%
NES-PGD 98.9% 417 93.6%
ZO-NGD 99.2 % 131 98%
the gradients through backpropagation. We report the aver-
age number of queries over 500 images for successful ad-
versaries on each dataset. On MNIST, NGD requires 2.12
queries while PGD needs 4.88 queries with  = 0.2. On
CIFAR-10, NGD requires 2.06 queries while PGD needs
4.21 queries with  = 0.1. On ImageNet, NGD requires
2.20 queries while PGD needs 5.62 queries with  = 0.05.
We can see that NGD achieves higher query efficiency by
incorporating FIM.
Evaluation on MNIST and CIFAR-10
In the evaluation on MNIST and CIFAR-10, we select 2000
correctly classified images from MNIST and CIFAR-10 test
datasets, respectively, and perform black-box attacks for
these images. We compare the ZO-NGD method with the
transfer attack (Papernot, McDaniel, and Goodfellow 2016),
ZOO black-box attack (Chen et al. 2017b), and the natural-
evolution-strategy-based projected gradient descent method
(NES-PGD) (Ilyas et al. 2018). For the transfer attack (Pa-
pernot, McDaniel, and Goodfellow 2016), we apply C&W
attack (Carlini and Wagner 2017) to the surrogate model.
The implementations of ZOO and NES-PGD are based on
the GitHub code released by the authors1. For the attack
methods, the pixel values of all images are normalized to
the range of [0, 1]. In the proposed ZO-NGD method, the
sampling number R in the random gradient estimation as
defined in Eq. (16) and (17) is set to 40.  is set to 0.4 for
MNIST and 0.2 for CIFAR-10 or ImageNet. In Eq. (16) and
(17), we set µ = 1 for three datasets. γ is set to 0.01.
The experimental results are summarized in Table 1. We
show the success rate and the average queries over suc-
cessful adversarial examples for the black-box attack meth-
ods on MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets. As shown in Ta-
ble 1, the transfer attack does not achieve high success rate
due to the difference between the surrogate model and the
original target model. The ZOO attack method can achieve
high success rate at the cost of excessive query complexity
since it performs gradient estimation for each pixel of the
input image. We can observe that the ZO-NGD method re-
quires significantly less queries than the NES-PGD method.
NES-PGD uses natural evolutionary strategies for gradient
1The code and appendix are available at https://github.com/
LinLabNEU/ZO NGD blackbox.
Table 2: Performance evaluation of black-box adversarial at-
tacks on ImageNet.
Attack method successrate
average
queries
reduction
ratio
ZOO attack 98.9% 16,800 0%
NES-PGD 94.6% 1,325 92.1%
Bandits[TD] 96.1% 791 95.3%
ZO-NGD 97% 582 96.5%
estimation and then perform first-order gradient descent to
obtain the adversarial perturbations. Compared with NES-
PGD, the proposed ZO-NGD not only estimates the first-
order gradients of the loss function, but also tries to ob-
tain the second-order Fisher information from the queries
without incurring additional query complexities, leading to
higher query-efficiency. From Table 1, we can observe that
the ZO-NGD method attains the smallest number of queries
to successfully obtain the adversarial examples in the black-
box setting. Benchmarking on the ZOO method, the query
reduction ratio of ZO-NGD can be as high as 93.7% on
MNIST and 98% on CIFAR-10.
Evaluation on ImageNet
We perform black-box adversarial attacks on ImageNet
where 1000 correctly classified images are randomly se-
lected. On ImageNet, we compare the proposed ZO-NGD
with the ZOO attack, NES-PGD method and the bandit at-
tack with time and data-dependent priors (named as Ban-
dits[TD]) (Ilyas, Engstrom, and Madry 2018). The transfer
attack is not performed since it is not easy to train a surrogate
model on ImageNet. The Bandits[TD] method makes use of
the prior information for the gradients estimation, including
the time-dependent priors which explores the heavily cor-
related successive gradients, and the data-dependent priors
which exploits the spatially local similarity exhibited in im-
ages. After gradient estimation with the priors or bandits in-
formation, first-order gradient descent method is applied.
We present the performance evaluation on ImageNet in
Table 2. The success rate and the average queries over suc-
cessful attacks for various black-box attack methods are re-
ported. Table 2 shows the ZOO attack method can achieve
high success rate with high query complexity due to its
element-wise gradient estimation. We can have a similar ob-
servation that the ZO-NGD method only requires a much
smaller number of queries than the NES-PGD method due
to the faster convergence rate of second-order optimization
by exploring the Fisher information. We also find that the
ZO-NGD method also outperforms the Bandits[TD] method
in terms of query efficiency. The Bandits[TD] method en-
hances the query efficiency of gradient estimations through
the incorporation of priors information for the gradients, but
its attack methodology is still based on the first-order gradi-
ent descent method. As observed from Table 2, the ZO-NGD
method achieves the highest query-efficiency for success-
ful adversarial attacks in the black-box setting. It can obtain
96.5% query reduction ratio on ImageNet when compared
Figure 1: The legitimate images and their adversarial examples
generated by ZO-NGD.
with the ZOO method. In Figure 1, we show some legitimate
images on ImageNet and their corresponding adversarial ex-
amples obtained by ZO-NGD. We can observe that the ad-
versarial perturbations are imperceptible. More examples on
MNIST and CIFAR-10 are shown in the appendix.
Ablation study
In this ablation study, we perform sensitivity analysis on the
proposed ZO-NGD method based variations in model archi-
tectures and different parameter settings. Below we summa-
rize the conclusion and findings from this ablation study and
report their details in the appendix. (1) Tested on VGG16
and ResNet and varying the parameters µ and  in ZO-NGD,
the results demonstrate the consistent superior performance
of ZO-NGD by leveraging the second-order optimization.
(2) We inspect the approximation techniques used in ZO-
NGD including damping and outer product method. The re-
sults show that there is a wide range of proper γ values such
that damping can work effectively to reduce the loss, and
the outer product is a reasonable approximation based on
the empirical evidence. We also note that the ASR of ZOO
is higher than ZO-NGD. We provide a discussion about the
ASR v.s. query number in the appendix.
Query Number Distribution Figure 2 shows the cumula-
tive distribution (CDF) of the query number for 1000 images
on three datasets, validating ZO-NGD’s query efficiency.
Figure 2: CDF of query number on three datasets using ZO-NGD.
Transferability
The transferability of adversarial examples is an interesting
and valuable metric to measure the performance. To show
the transferability, we use 500 targeted adversarial examples
generated by ZO-NGD on ImageNet with  = 0.1 on Incep-
tion to attack ResNet and VGG16 model. It achieves 94.4%
and 95.6% ASR, respectively, demonstrating high transfer-
ability of our method. Our transferred ASR is also higher
than NES-PGD (92.1% and 92.9% ASR).
Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a novel ZO-NGD to achieve high
query-efficiency in black-box adversarial attacks. It incor-
porates the ZO random gradient estimation and the second-
order FIM for NGD. The performance evaluation on three
image classification datasets demonstrate the effectiveness
of the proposed method in terms of fast convergence and
improved query efficiency over state-of-the-art methods.
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Appendix
Geometric Interpretation
We provide a geometric interpretation for the natural gradi-
ent in this section. The negative gradient−∇f(δ) can be in-
terpreted as the steepest descent direction in the sense that it
yields the most reduction in f per unit of change of δ, where
the change is measured by the standard Euclidean norm ‖·‖
(Martens 2014), as shown below,
−∇f(δ)
‖∇f(δ)‖ = lim→0
1

arg min
‖α‖≤
f(δ +α). (24)
By following the −∇f(δ) direction, we can obtain the
change of δ within a certain -neighbourhood to minimize
the loss function.
As the loss function is related to the likelihood, we can ex-
plore the steepest direction to minimize the loss in the space
of all possible likelihoods (i.e. distribution space). KL diver-
gence (Kullback and Leibler 1951) is a popular measure of
the distance between two distributions. For two distributions
p (t|δ) and p (t|δ′), their KL divergence is defined as
KL
[
p (t|δ) ||p (t|δ′)] = ∫ p (t|δ) log p (t|δ)
p (t|δ′)dt. (25)
Lemma 3 The FIM F is the Hessian of KL divergence be-
tween two distributions p(t|δ) and p(t|δ + α), with respect
to α, evaluated at α = 0.
The proof is shown in the appendix. By Lemma 3, the FIM
can be regarded as the curvature in the distribution space.
Lemma 4 The second order Taylor expansion of the KL di-
vergence can be expressed as
KL [p(t|δ)||p(t|δ +α)] ≈ 1
2
αTFα. (26)
We provide a proof in the appendix.
Next we explore the direction to minimize the loss func-
tion in the distribution space where the distance is measured
by the KL divergence. Although in general, the KL diver-
gence is not symmetric, it is (approximately) symmetric in a
local neighborhood. The problem can be formulated as
α∗ = argmin
KL[p(t|δ)||p(t|δ+α)]=m
f(δ +α). (27)
where m is a certain constant. The purpose of fixing the KL
divergence to a constant is to move along the distribution
space with a constant speed, regardless of the curvature.
Thus, we can obtain Lemma 2 and show its proof in the
appendix. In the parameter space, the negative gradient is
the steepest descent direction to minimize the loss function.
By contrast, in the distribution space, the steepest descent di-
rection is the negative natural gradient. Thus, the direction in
distribution space defined by the natural gradient will be in-
variant to the choice of parameterization (Pascanu and Ben-
gio 2013b), i.e., it will not be affected by how the model is
parametrized, but only depends on the distribution induced
by the parameters.
Proof of Lemmas
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof of Lemma 1.
E
p(t,x|δ)
[s(δ)] = E
p(t,x|δ)
[∇ log p(t,x|δ)]
=
∫
∇ log p(t,x|δ)p(t,x|δ)dt dx
=
∫ ∇p(t,x|δ)
p(t,x|δ) p(t,x|δ)dt dx
= ∇
∫
p(t,x|δ)dt dx
= 0
Proof of Lemma 3
Proof of Lemma 3. The gradients of the KL divergence can
be expressed as
∇αKL [p(t|δ)||p(t|δ + α)] = ∇α
∫
p(t|δ) log p(t|δ)
p(t|δ + α)dt
= ∇α
∫
p(t|δ) log p(t|δ)dt
−∇α
∫
p(t|δ) log p(t|δ + α)dt
= −∇α
∫
p(t|δ) log p(t|δ + α)dt
= −
∫
p(t|δ)∇α log p(t|δ + α)dt
(28)
∇2αKL [p(t|δ)||p(t|δ + α)] = −
∫
p(t|δ)∇2α log p(t|δ + α)dt
(29)
The Hessian of the KL divergence is defined by
HKL[p(t|δ)||p(t|δ+α)] = −
∫
p(t|δ)∇2α log p(t|δ + α)|α=0dt
= −
∫
p(t|δ)Hlog p(t|δ)dt
= − E
p(t|δ)
[
Hlog p(t|δ)
]
= F (30)
Proof of Lemma 4
Proof of Lemma 4.
KL [p(t|δ)||p(t|δ + α)] ≈ KL [p(t|δ)||p(t|δ)]
+ (∇αKL [p(t|δ)||p(t|δ + α)] |α=0)Tα
+
1
2
αTFα
= KL [p(t|δ)||p(t|δ)]
− E
p(t|δ)
[∇δ log p(t|δ)]Tα
+
1
2
αTFα (31)
Notice that the first term is zero as they are the same distri-
butions. The second term is zero due to Lemma 1.
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof of Lemma 2. The Lagrangian function of the mini-
mization can be formulated as
L(α) = f(δ + α) + φ (KL [p(t|δ)||p(t|δ + α)]− c)
≈ f(δ) +∇f(δ)Tα+ 1
2
φαTFα− φc (32)
To solve this minimization, we set its derivative to zero:
∂
∂α
(
f(δ) +∇δf(δ)Tα+ 1
2
ϕαTFα− ϕc
)
= 0 (33)
∇δf(δ) + ϕFα = 0 (34)
α = − 1
ϕ
F−1∇δf(δ) (35)
We can see that the negative natural gradient defines the
steepest direction in the distribution space.
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Figure A1: The legitimate images and their adversarial examples
generated by ZO-NGD on MNIST and CIFAR-10. The misclassi-
fied class are shown on top of each image.
Ablation study
Various Models To check the performance of the pro-
posed method on various model architecture, we per-
formed experiments on three datasets using two new mod-
els (VGG16 & ResNet) and summarized the results in Ta-
ble A1. The proposed ZO-NGD is more query-efficient than
NES-PGD.
Parameter Analysis The sensitivity analysis on the pa-
rameters µ and  are demonstrated in Table A2. As observed
form Table A2, the ZO-NGD performance is robust to dif-
ferent µ values (fixing  = 0.2), and larger  leads to fewer
queries.
In second-order optimization, damping is a common tech-
nique to compensate for errors in the quadratic approxima-
tion. The parameter γ plays a key role in damping. To show
the influence of γ, we demonstrate the loss after 2 ADMM
iterations for a wide range of γ values with the same initial-
ization in Figure A2(a). We observe that 0.01 or 0.001 is an
appropriate choice for γ to achieve higher query efficiency.
Table A1: Attack success rate (ASR) and query # for two
new models.
MNIST (VGG) CIFAR10 (VGG)
ASR Query ASR Query
NES-PGD 99.2% 1082 98.3% 381
ZO-NGD 99.5% 548 98.2% 152
ImageNet (VGG) ImageNet (ResNet)
ASR Query ASR Query
NES-PGD 96.8% 1136 97.2% 1281
ZO-NGD 96.5% 594 98.1% 624
Table A2: Attack success rate (ASR) and query # for various
hyper-parameters on ImageNet (Inception).
Value of µ, while fixing  = 0.2
1 0.1 0.01
ASR Query ASR Query ASR Query
97.3% 626 97% 582 96.6% 596
Value of , while fixing µ = 0.1
0.15 0.2 0.25
ASR Query ASR Query ASR Query
96.1% 619 97% 583 98.2% 559
Drift of Outer Product Although we adopt outer product
(Equ. (12)) to approximate Equ. (9), we use the empirical ev-
idence below to motivate why Equ. (12) dominates in Equ.
(9) and the approximation is reasonable. For a well-trained
model, the prediction probability of a correctly classified im-
age usually dominates the probability distribution, that is,
p(t|x, δ) is usually much larger than other probabilities if
t is correct and δ is small. We plot the average prediction
probability distribution of 1000 correctly classified images
on CIFAR-10 and ImageNet for their top-10 labels in Fig-
ure A2(b). As observed from Figure A2(b), the correct label
usually dominates in the probability distribution, leading to
reasonable approximation loss from Equ. (9) to Equ. (12).
(a) Influence of γ on MNIST (b) probability distribution
Figure A2: Influence of γ and prediction probability distribution.
Prediction probability distribution on CIFAR-10/ImageNet.
